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A RESPONSE TO BEYOND SEPARATION: PROFESSOR COPELAND’S
AMBITIOUS PROPOSAL FOR “INTEGRATIVE” FEDERALISM
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard

*

Professor Charlton Copeland offers a wide-ranging, ambitious critique of what he characterizes as federalism jurisprudence’s dominant models of “separation” and “allocation” of authority between the
1
respective federal and state spheres. Judicial resolution of federalism
questions, he suggests, turns inappropriately and incompletely on the
2
moment of a law’s enactment. This “obsession with the legislative
3
process as the object of federalism enforcement” ignores the more
nuanced interactive processes between federal and state authorities
that occur after a statute is enacted and as it is implemented through
administrative channels. Particularly in the context of cooperative
federal-state programs, such as Medicaid, Congress enacts the broad
requirements with which states must comply in order to receive federal funding or avoid federal preemption. Congress also typically
delegates rulemaking authority to an executive branch agency to
flesh out the details and supervise state implementation of the program. Necessarily, then, the federal agency will engage in ongoing
monitoring, negotiation, and enforcement of state authorities. It is
this sub-congressional, continual interaction between federal and
state authorities that Copeland finds inadequately captured in existing federalism scholarship and doctrine.
The omission matters, Copeland suggests, because courts’ myopic
focus on the initial exercise of congressional authority may “allow[]
for continued interactions where substantive regulatory authority may
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Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I wish to thank my co-presenter
Charlton Copeland for his provocative manuscript and comments for the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 2012 Symposium on FDR and Obama: Are There
Constitutional Law Lessons from the New Deal for the Obama Administration?, and my coauthors Kevin Outterson and Nicole Huberfeld for their comprehensive analysis in Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91 (2012).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103.
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not exist.” In other words, a statute that was easily constitutional at
the time of enactment might “become” unconstitutional when the
court considers the larger life of the program over the course of time.
Accordingly, to accurately determine whether a federal statute violates structural limits on federal power, courts must consider the considerable role of administrative agencies in federalism practice and
policymaking. Copeland’s characterization of the ongoing federalstate interaction in cooperative federalism programs is undoubtedly
descriptively accurate. But it is less clear what constitutional work
that observation is doing, how courts deciding federalism cases would
implement his insight, or why agency-level interactions, even between
federal and state officials, are not otherwise adequately captured in
administrative law doctrine.
As far as how courts might implement Copeland’s insight, perhaps
they would draw lines between federal and state authority in different
places if they considered how the challenged federal program has
been implemented. Under the predominant separation and allocation models, Copeland suggests that a federal statute “privilege[d]” as
constitutional at the time of enactment is thereafter forever shielded
from federalism challenges, regardless of any post-enactment policy5
making at the agency level. Future interactions between federal and
state officials “do[] not appear to impact the assessment of whether a
6
statute is consistent with the Constitution’s federalism dictates.” But
might those interactions nevertheless be constitutionally significant
for separation of powers purposes relevant to administrative law?
More fundamentally, it is not clear that Copeland’s observation
changes the underlying question. Accepting the premise that courts
cannot accurately judge the constitutionality of a statute without considering the actual life of the program, rather than just the static
moment of passage, the ultimate question is still allocation and separation: whether federal power has crossed the line into states’ reserved
powers. Under Copeland’s suggestion, that inquiry would be determined not simply on the face of the statute but as actually carried out
by a federal agency. The analytical method and relevant “evidence”
for resolving the question would be more nuanced. But courts would
still be drawing lines: separating and allocating power between the respective federal and state spheres. The suggestion that courts merely
consider additional evidence in resolving federalism questions, while

4
5
6

Id. at 100.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
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not without controversy, is more modest than the one that Copeland
wants to make.
Copeland seems to want to say something more revolutionary,
something that will shake up the dominant separation and allocation
models of federalism, as a theoretical, and not just jurisprudential,
matter. Even accepting the descriptive accuracy of Copeland’s observations, it is not clear what the alternative model would look like.
What would the “interactive” or “integrative” model do? Would it
question the hard-wired constitutional design that explicitly enumerates federal power and reserves all unenumerated powers to states?
Surely it could not. Would it soften the inquiry, finding fewer areas
of unconstitutional conflict and fewer federal programs challengeable on federalism grounds? Perhaps the actual course of dealings between federal and state authorities would reveal more room for exercise of state power than the statutory design suggests, thereby
rebutting the federalism challenge to the law. Would Copeland’s alternative model suggest, as the Framers did and recent commentators
7
have, that friction and jarring between federal and state authorities is
actually consistent with the constitutional design? Or would the
course of dealing reveal statutes previously considered clearly within
congressional power as now unconstitutional? Copeland’s concern
about federal statutes being forever “privileged” and the Supreme
Court’s recent Medicaid decision in National Federation of Independent
8
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) both suggest that final possibility.
INTEGRATIVE FEDERALISM IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS
Copeland’s signal example of the dominance of the separation
model in federalism jurisprudence is the Supreme Court’s recent de9
cision in NFIB. In a series of “June surprises,” the Court struck down
a federal conditional spending program, namely, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) expansion of Medicaid eligi-

7

8
9

See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal
Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 122 (2010) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at
426–27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145 (2003); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003,
1007 (2003); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1752–59
(2005); and others).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/the-june-surprises-balls-strikesand-the-fog-of-war/.
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10

bility to all low-income adults. To be precise, the NFIB Court did
not actually strike any provision of the ACA but instead held that a
long-standing provision of the 1965 Medicaid Act, authorizing the
Secretary to withhold federal funds from noncompliant states, could
not constitutionally be applied to states that declined to implement
11
Copeland characterizes NFIB’s
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Medicaid decision as a missed opportunity to employ his integrative
vision of federalism.
12
To be sure, NFIB represents “a sharp break from past precedent.”
It is the Court’s first decision since the New Deal to strike down a
federal spending power enactment and also the Court’s first application of, as opposed to dicta reference to, the “coercion doctrine” as a
13
limit on federal conditional spending power. Copeland struggles to
make a case for how the NFIB decision perpetuates the separation
and allocation dominant paradigm. What makes his argument tough
to swallow is that the justices, in fact, do a pretty good job of acknowledging the course of dealing between federal and state officials over
the life of the Medicaid program and infusing their reasoning with
those observations. Justice Ginsburg offers the most accurate, nu14
anced discussion of the program, but the other justices’ opinions
have moments of insight as well.
The highly fractured decision in NFIB produced three separate
opinions: the Roberts plurality, holding that states could not be re15
quired to expand Medicaid but must be given the option; the Ginsburg dissent, concluding that Congress was well within its spending
16
power to require Medicaid expansion; and the unsigned joint dissent, which would have held Medicaid expansion unconstitutional
and nonseverable, and therefore the whole of the ACA unconstitu17
tional. For Copeland, all three opinions adhere disappointingly to
18
He
the established allocation/separation model of federalism.
notes that each opinion does, in fact, describe and consider the on10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at
2666 (joint dissent).
Id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 96.
See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2013).
Accord Nicole Huberfeld, Heed Not the Umpire: Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 43 (2013) (explaining how “Justice Ginsburg’s nuanced approach to the facts in NFIB led her to the correct constitutional analysis”).
132 S. Ct. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2668 (joint dissent).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 154.
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going federal-state interactions in the Medicaid program, offering a
glimmer of hope for his alternative thesis but ultimately failing to
19
On closer examination, however, the opinions hew
embrace it.
closer to Copeland’s ideal norm of engagement than his analysis suggests.
Copeland faults both the Roberts plurality and the Ginsburg dissent for improperly focusing on a static moment of congressional action: for Roberts, the enactment of the ACA and “new Medicaid” in
2010; for Ginsburg, the enactment of the original Medicaid Act in
20
1965. Both approaches ignore the ongoing federal agency involvement with the states to implement fifty different state Medicaid Plans
21
over almost thirty years. Copeland notes that State Plans are characterized by wide variation among covered groups, covered services, insurance models, reimbursement methodologies, and coordination
22
with other federal and state programs. Each unique State Plan is
the product of extensive interaction and negotiation between the
23
federal agency and the individual state authorities. Each State Plan,
accordingly, expresses policy choices and priorities, more tailored
24
and more detailed than the broad congressional design. The justices’ analyses are incomplete for failing to reflect those integrative pro25
cesses, Copeland concludes.
Copeland highlights features of the Medicaid program that the
justices’ opinions overlooked, including the history of the program
26
and its current operation. He finds particularly telling a relatively
recent development in the administration of the program that allows
states considerable flexibility to waive otherwise mandatory federal
27
requirements.
Although the waiver process has become an important feature of the Medicaid program, Copeland paints a picture
of a much more fluid, flexible program than Medicaid truly is. Waivers do allow states to expand or modify coverage for certain groups of
people and certain types of services. But for the bulk of the “deserv28
ing” poor historically served by the Medicaid program, federal statutory and regulatory requirements with which states must comply to

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 158, 162–67.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 130–31.
See id. at 132–34.
See id. at 132.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 126–39.
Id. at 135–36.
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 13–17 (describing the history of
Medicaid and the “deserving” poor).
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receive federal dollars remain fairly rigid and nonnegotiable. Indeed, the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid was enacted as a mandatory
requirement on states, not a flexible option (although the Roberts
opinion effectively rewrote this). In focusing on Medicaid waivers,
Copeland overplays his hand, suggesting greater incongruity between
his preferred approach to federalism and the justices’ reasoning in
NFIB.
A couple of clarifications are warranted. First, Copeland understates the mandatoriness of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, suggest30
ing there is an “underlying threat” that the federal government
might terminate states’ federal funding for noncompliance. He dismisses that possibility as impractical and unlikely, given the enmeshment of federal and state bureaucratic structures in the Medicaid
31
arena. While it is true that the federal government has never actually withheld all of a state’s federal Medicaid dollars for noncompli32
ance, there is more than an “underlying threat.” That sanction is
33
expressly authorized in the original 1965 Medicaid Act. The fact
that the provision reserves discretion to the federal agency whether to
impose the ultimate sanction or to negotiate an alternative remedial
34
plan with a state actually supports Copeland’s thesis, demonstrating
that Congress clearly anticipated an interactive process between federal and state authorities.
Copeland loses sight of that point with a second misstatement. He
asserts that the “ACA [as opposed to the original Medicaid Act] delegated authority to the Secretary to withhold all federal Medicaid re35
imbursement funds for states failing to expand Medicaid eligibility.”
But the ACA does no such thing; it added no new penalties but merely expanded Medicaid eligibility in step with numerous prior amend36
37
ments over the life of the program. Each prior expansion, like the
38
ACA expansion, has been subject to the same potential sanction of
loss of all federal funds for states that fail to comply. The 1965 statu29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38

See id. at 17–20 (describing mandatory and optional coverage categories).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 133.
Id.
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 17.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).
See id; 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.15, 430.18, 430.20, 430.60 et seq. (2011) (detailing process for resolving state noncompliance).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 138.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(k)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
See Copeland, supra note 1, at 137 (noting that the ACA Medicaid expansion “is only the
latest in a line of expansions of the program since its enactment, but primarily in the late
1980s and 1990s”); see also Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 20–24 (detailing how “Congress has repeatedly expanded Medicaid”).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(k)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
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tory sanction figured prominently in the justices’ opinions, suggesting, contrary to Copeland’s concern, that courts can, and, here in
fact did, consider the ongoing interactions of federal administrative
agencies and regulated states in evaluating federalism questions.
For Copeland, the locus of the NFIB opinions’ failure to employ
40
an integrative model of federalism is the “notice” prong. “Clear no41
tice” was one of the South Dakota v. Dole commandeering limits,
42
which the NFIB Court incorporated into the coercion analysis. The
notion is that cooperative federalism programs are “in the nature of a
43
contract” and, as such, one party cannot unilaterally change the
terms of the contract without providing notice to the other party. To
Copeland’s view, the notice and contract analogy perpetuates the jurisprudential focus on the initial enactment of a statute, rather than
44
future implementation and federal-state interaction. For Ginsburg,
the contract, i.e., the 1965 statute, is valid because it expressly reserved Congress’s unilateral right to repeal, amend, and revise the
45
statute and clearly specified funding withdrawal as a potential penal46
ty for state noncompliance with program requirements. For Roberts, the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid represented an entirely new
contract, which failed to provide states with clear notice of its terms,
including the possibility of loss of all federal Medicaid funding, old
47
and new.
Copeland concludes that the justices’ “depiction of
Spending Clause legislation as an offer to contract emphasizes the
48
independence and voluntary choice of the state governments,”
thereby perpetuating the separation/allocation model.
But it seems just as consistent with the analogy to consider the
parties’ course of dealing as relevant to the contract interpretation.
In the Medicaid context, for example, courts might consider the federally approved State Plan, and the negotiation process that occurs
between federal agency and each respective state’s authorities in ap-

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–05 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2629–30 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2657 (joint dissent).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 153–54.
483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 51–55 (explaining the “clear notice” requirement and examining its role in the NFIB opinions).
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 153–54.
42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 159.
Id. at 162–65.
Id. at 157.
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49

proving that State Plan on an annual basis, as the relevant contract,
rather than the statute enacted by Congress. Even if the Medicaid
Act is viewed as the contract, that statute, like so many other federal
statutes, expressly delegated implementation to a federal agency.
That delegation, along with other terms of the statutory contract,
clearly apprised both parties that further interactions would occur
and binding requirements would be added over time. Even if notice
were the only limit animating the NFIB decision, that point is not
necessarily inconsistent with Copeland’s integrative view of federalism.
Moreover, all three opinions consider various additional factors
besides clear notice, with key reasoning turning on the ongoing interaction between federal and state authorities. Chief Justice Roberts,
for example, concluded that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion crossed
the line from pressure to compulsion because of the amount of money that states now have at stake in the program, after nearly three
50
decades of involvement. He noted, by contrast, that the federal
government could offer an equally large quantum of new conditional
51
funding to states without violating the coercion doctrine.
The
preexisting state participation and potential loss of all Medicaid funding—old and new—was what rendered the ACA expansion unconsti52
tutional.
As Copeland notes, the Chief Justice also highlighted the “intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many
53
decades.” But Copeland understands the Chief Justice’s reasoning
to stall on the notice issue, concluding that Congress failed to provide
adequate notice of sweeping new conditions to Medicaid, rather than
54
considering the course of dealing between federal and state actors.
But clear notice is just one of at least three prongs of reasoning that
55
animate the Roberts opinion. The Chief Justice’s observation about
49

50
51

52
53
54
55

See 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10, 430.12 (2011); Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at
17; see also Copeland, supra note 1, at 135–36 (describing the interactive process around
Medicaid waivers).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use.”).
Id. (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 164 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.,
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)).
Id. at 164–65.
See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 55–67 (also discussing the Roberts
opinion’s use of relatedness and quantitative and qualitative coercion).
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the decades of entanglement demonstrates why, as a practical matter,
states can no longer opt out. The amount of money at stake further
leaves them with no real choice.
According to Copeland, Justice Ginsburg also caves to the clear
notice rationale, relying on the fact that the Medicaid statute has,
since 1965, reserved Congress’s right to repeal, amend, or change the
56
program. As Copeland accurately notes, Ginsburg describes in detail various amendments to the program over time, some of which
significantly increased the number and categories of individuals eli57
gible for the program. But he does not see her observations doing
any real work in the Ginsburg analysis. She notes the interaction be58
tween states and the federal government over time but does not infuse that observation with constitutional significance. Yet it seems
very much to her clear notice point that Congress not only reserved
the right to amend the program but, in fact, has used it repeatedly
over the years with no state objection or at least no finding of constitutional violation.
That history of Medicaid expansion and amendments over the
years also supports Justice Ginsburg’s broader point that the ACA
59
does not create a “new” conditional spending program, as Chief Justice Roberts maintained. Accordingly, she found it inapt to suggest
that Congress was penalizing states that refuse to participate in a
“new” program by withdrawing funds for an existing federal pro60
gram. “Congress is simply requiring States to do what States have
long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with
61
the conditions Congress prescribes for participation,” conditions
which were always, in law and in fact, subject to change.
The joint dissenters, too, consider the on-the-ground operation of
the Medicaid program, not merely its moment of statutory enactment. In particular, they highlight states’ budgetary realities in sup62
port of the conclusion that the ACA expansion would be coercive.
The dissenters note that federal Medicaid funding represents one63
fifth of the average state’s budget. Given that reality, the possibility
of loss of all existing Medicaid funding for states that do not agree to
64
expand as required by the ACA would be coercive. The centrality of
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Copeland, supra note 1, at 158.
Id. at 158–59.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629–30 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2631.
Id. at 2635–36.
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2662–63 (joint dissent).
Id. at 2657.
Id.
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that fact in the dissent’s analysis reflects a clear recognition of the
enmeshment and interdependence of federal and state authorities
under the Medicaid program, seemingly consistent with Copeland’s
thesis.
That perspective is further reflected in the dissent’s practical politics “double taxation” argument. The argument suggests that states,
as a practical matter, cannot expect their citizens to pay federal taxes
to support the Medicaid program, only to have their own state opt
out of the conditional funding program and then have to exact state
taxes to support an alternative, fully state-funded indigent health care
65
program. Copeland notes that argument but concludes that the dissent ultimately refracts it through the lens of separation and allocation, defining the respective spheres of federal and state taxing au66
thority. He finds the dissent’s reasoning to overlook “the ways in
which fiscal federalism entangles the state and the national govern67
ment.” His argument becomes strained, however, and the path of
less resistance would be to cite the reality of tax politics as an example
of the justices’ acknowledgement of the interactive process of federal
and state governance.
Copeland’s disappointment with the NFIB opinions is that they
are descriptively accurate of the dynamic process of federal-state cooperation but fail to give constitutional significance to his (and their)
observations that federalism issues are more nuanced and fact-based
than the face of a particular federal statute reflects. It remains unclear, however, just how Copeland would have the Court decide differently. The final part of his paper draws on administrative law as a
68
promising source of a “norm of engagement.”
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LESSONS FOR INTEGRATIVE FEDERALISM
The federal-state interactions that Copeland identifies, even if not
constitutionally significant for federalism, are constitutionally significant for separation of powers, which structural limit underlies administrative law. Federalism allocates power vertically between the federal government and the states, while administrative law allocates power
horizontally among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
To be sure, federal statutory enactments do not stop at the steps of
the Capitol, and courts are frequently called upon to review whether
an executive branch agency has exceeded the scope of its congres65
66
67
68

Id. at 2661–62.
Copeland, supra note 1, at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167.
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sional delegation. In addition to those separation of powers questions, there is ample literature on the role of administrative agencies
in policymaking and their entanglement with (or capture by) the in69
dustries they regulate.
Federal programs that call for state participation necessarily place
federal agencies in ongoing relationships with state officials.
Copeland offers a federalism overlay to administrative law topics, noting the role of federal agencies, through interaction and negotiation
with states as regulated “industries,” in developing or altering congressional policies. In addition to Medicaid, Copeland offers the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, and
the REAL ID Act, as examples of the “entanglement between state
70
and national policy makers that exemplifies cooperative federalism.”
Those examples are descriptively compelling but do not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that federalism issues must be infused with
administrative law principles, or explain why federalism and administrative law cannot operate in tandem to protect constitutional values.
Copeland’s answer is that courts play a critical role in enforcing
the administrative law “norm of engagement,” and could do the same
71
in the federalism context. He cites the Court’s drug and pharma72
ceutical device preemption cases, including Wyeth v. Levine, as examples of the way that courts “can protect federalism values in the
73
policy-implementation stage in ways by forcing agency engagement.”
In Wyeth, the Court rejected the Food and Drug Administration’s independent determination that its labeling requirements preempted
state tort law not because federalism questions are outside the prevue

69

70
71
72
73

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1043 (1997) (suggesting that “the courts’ assertiveness during the period from
roughly 1967 to 1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by expert and nonpolitical elites. . . . The principal pathology emphasized during these years was ‘capture,’ meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the industry they were charged with regulating”); Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683
(1975) (noting that “the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially
legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected
by agency policy”); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–60 (1996) (noting transition from expertise
to politics as a justification for agency rulemaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest,
and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1986) (discussing agency
capture); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1986); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 150. See also id. at 141–53 (describing the statutory schemes).
Id. at 105–06.
555 U.S. 555 (2009).
Copeland, supra note 1, at 106.
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of federal agencies but because the agency failed to involve stake74
holders, including states, in the determination. The Court’s decision, then, pushed for a “norm of engagement” between federal and
75
state authorities.
Another example that Copeland might have considered is Douglas
76
v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, also from the
Court’s last term and also raising significant federalism questions in
the context of the Medicaid program. In Douglas, a group of California Medicaid beneficiaries and providers challenged two amendments to the state’s Medicaid program that reduced provider reim77
bursement. The plaintiffs argued that the amendments conflicted
with a federal Medicaid requirement that states offer reasonable reimbursement, sufficient to uphold the Medicaid program’s “equal ac78
cess” guarantee. Recognizing the Court’s recent restrictions on the
79
availability of § 1983 causes of action, the plaintiffs brought their
claim under the federal Supremacy Clause, arguing that the California reimbursement rules were preempted by the federal Medicaid
80
Act’s reasonable reimbursement requirement.
A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed, enjoining
the State of California from implementing the new state statutory
81
amendments.
Meanwhile, California had already submitted the
amendments to the federal administrative agency, the Centers for
82
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), for final approval. During
the pendency of the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, CMS in fact
83
approved the California rate changes. Given the change in posture
of the case, the Court declined to resolve the question presented:
whether a party challenging the constitutionality of a state law could
84
bring a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Because the
agency had acted, the proper question now was under the Adminis-

74
75
76
77
78
79

80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 177 (explaining Wyeth).
See id. at 179–80.
132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1209.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (emphasizing that, absent exceptional circumstances, “federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by
§ 1983”).
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1208–09.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
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trative Procedure Act : whether the federal agency acted within its
86
delegated authority to approve the rates.
Applying Copeland’s insights, Douglas began as a separation and
allocation question but, through the course of dealing between the
state, the federal agency, and the judiciary, was transformed into an
interactive administrative law case. The shift may cause some heartache for the plaintiffs, who lost the opportunity for judicial resolution
under the de novo standard of review in exchange for administrative
adjudication with judicial review only after exhaustion and under
87
deferential arbitrary and capricious review. But the case does seem
88
to “offer a unique perspective on federalism’s bureaucratic life” and
exemplifies Copeland’s preference for an integrative, dynamic approach to federalism. The Court’s ultimate refusal to decide the
larger federalism question forced a re-engagement of federal and
state authorities. In sum, NFIB and Douglas, two seminal federalism
decisions from last term, suggest that the Supreme Court may not be
as far away from Copeland’s preferred norm of engagement than
even he suggests.
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